

POLICY BRIEF

Reforming EU-Tunisia Migration Cooperation:

How to Prevent Discrimination and Fundamental Rights Violations
Committed in the Name of Security?

June 2026



AUTHORS:

Giulia Beccacece | Romane Bompard Caubel | Eya Bouafia | Meriam Boughanmi
Hamed Chemli | Yassine Dassi | Matilde Fabiano | Ania Hargas | Garance Jungman
Kmar Ltifi | Azza Masmoudi

Executive Summary

This policy brief examines the modalities of migration cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Tunisia, in light of the entry into force of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum in June 2026, which notably strengthens border control mechanisms, accelerates return procedures, and expands the use of digital surveillance technologies.

It highlights the risks of discrimination and violations of migrants' fundamental rights – particularly those affecting sub-Saharan nationals – arising from an increasingly security-driven approach to migration governance. It also raises significant concerns regarding inadequate personal data protection and the lack of institutional safeguards in third countries that are often inaccurately designated as “safe”.

Against the backdrop of the growing securitisation and criminalisation of migration, the increasing informalisation of cooperation agreements between the EU and its externalisation partners (notably Tunisia), and the normalisation of racist discourses on both sides of the Mediterranean, this policy brief puts forward a set of recommendations addressed primarily to EU Member States, as well as to Tunisian authorities and media actors.

It calls for a reorientation of migration policies towards a model grounded in the protection of human rights and solidarity actors, transparency and democratic accountability, and the rejection of racist narratives disseminated in public and media spheres, with the ultimate objective of moving beyond the security paradigm that has shaped European migration governance for decades.

This policy brief was prepared by Giulia Beccacece, Romane Bompard Caubel, Matilde Fabiano, Ania Hargas, Garance Jungman (students at the Sciences Po Law School Clinic), Eya Bouafia, Meriam Boughanmi, Hamed Chemli, Yassine Dassi, Kmar Ltifi, Azza Masmoudi (students at the Faculty of Legal, Political and Social Sciences in Tunis, FSJPST) at the request of Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF), with the support of ASF (Lamine Benghazi, Elodie Hut and Giorgia Linardi), and under the supervision of their tutors (Maëlys Renoux San Millan and Dorra Naila Jaibi).

It is the result of a collaboration between the Euromed office of Avocats Sans Frontières, the “Access to Law” and “Migration” legal clinics of the Sciences Po Law School, and the “Migration and Asylum” legal clinic of the FSJPST, which forms part of the broader Tackle project (<https://asf.be/project/tackle/>), aimed at promoting youth activism in the fight against structural racism, notably through partnerships with legal clinics.

This policy brief draws on a research report prepared by Sciences Po students as part of this project, titled: “From the Northern to the Southern Shore of the Mediterranean: Securitisation and Digitalisation of Migration. A Study of the Digitalisation of Migration Management as a Tool for Discrimination against Racialised Migrants and Driver of Fundamental Rights Violations in the Context of EU-Tunisia Migration Cooperation”, available at the following link: <https://asf.be/resources-tools/publications>.

This policy brief was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of Avocats Sans Frontières and should in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union, Sciences Po or the Faculty of Legal, Political and Social Sciences in Tunis.

Introduction

Over the past two decades, European migration governance has progressively been shaped by the securitisation of borders, turning migration into a primary object of control. Irregular migration has gradually been reframed as a criminal justice issue, reflecting a shift from immigration law towards the criminal justice sphere, at the risk of exacerbating the legal and social marginalisation of migrant communities.

This evolution forms part of a broader trend towards the “securitisation of mobilities”, linking migration with criminality and security threats.^[1] The *EU Pact on Migration and Asylum*, which entered into force in June 2026, reinforces this dynamic by strengthening **border controls, data collection, and digital surveillance measures**. Following a similar security-driven logic, the proposed *EU Return Regulation*, which is expected to enter into force at the same time, expands **accelerated “return” mechanisms**.

This orientation forms part of a broader structuring of the European Union’s migration policy around two complementary pillars: an *internal* pillar focused on strengthening controls at European borders, harmonising asylum procedures and managing returns; and an *external* pillar based on the **externalisation of migration controls to third countries**. The latter reflects a “displacement of the boundaries of the law”,^[2] aimed less at safeguarding people’s lives and dignity than at containing migratory movements outside of EU territory, whilst contributing to a dilution of legal responsibilities.

This externalisation logic is embedded in asymmetrical power relations between EU Member States and third countries, and tends to produce **differentiated effects depending on national origin**, thereby **resulting in discrimination**. By targeting nationals of non-EU countries, these policies contribute to the reproduction of **structural racism**, implicitly associating certain nationalities or regions with security risks or migratory undesirability, and thereby legitimising regimes of exception in access to protection and fundamental rights.

The *Memorandum of Understanding* (MoU) between the EU and Tunisia, concluded in July 2023, illustrates this orientation by combining financial support and technical assistance, in a context where Tunisia has become a key player along the Central Mediterranean migration route. This growing reliance on soft law instruments contributes to the **informalisation of the Union’s external action**, largely circumventing traditional democratic and legal oversight mechanisms. Responsibility for migration management is increasingly delegated to third countries through surveillance mechanisms, particularly digital ones, aimed at anticipating and intercepting movements at the EU’s external borders. The **digitalisation of migration controls**, now a cornerstone of European policies, raises significant concerns regarding data protection, procedural safeguards, and fundamental rights.

This situation is all the more problematic as it takes place in a context where **violations of migrants’ fundamental rights in partner countries**, particularly in Tunisia, have been extensively documented by international organisations. UN Special Rapporteurs have also raised concerns about migrants’ living conditions in Tunisia and the continued cooperation between Tunisia and the EU despite documented violations of international law.^[3]



This document calls on European institutions and their partners to act accordingly. It sets out **policy recommendations to rethink migration cooperation between the EU and Tunisia**, ensuring effective legal and political oversight of the instruments that structure it, and moving away from the currently dominant securitarian approach.

Policy Brief

1

The increased securitisation and criminalisation of migration in EU-Tunisia cooperation

Migration cooperation between the European Union and Tunisia is part of a growing trend towards the **externalisation and securitisation of migration policies**. Institutional discourses increasingly move away from a human rights-based approach, instead framing “irregular” migration as a security threat. In this context, the adoption of the *EU Pact on Migration and Asylum* consolidates and legitimises a set of pre-existing practices, including strengthened external border controls, the criminalisation of irregular migration, the acceleration of return procedures, and the deployment of digital surveillance systems.^[4]

In practice, **return mechanisms** constitute a central pillar of the new border control system. Decisions are accelerated and based on instruments that leave significant room for interpretation, leading to differentiated treatment based on **racial profiling** and immigration status. Certain groups of migrants, particularly sub-Saharan African nationals, are more likely to be exposed to interception, detention and deportation. The deployment of digital surveillance systems and the strengthening of **screening procedures** form part of this return policy by facilitating procedures on both sides of the Mediterranean. The growing use of surveillance technologies, combined with the implementation of the *Entry/Exit System* (EES) and the expansion of database interoperability (Eurodac, SIS, VIS), institutionalises a **technology-driven approach to migration management**.

These measures raise serious concerns regarding the indiscriminate collection of data at the EU’s external and internal borders and the handling of biometric data, which is more prone to systematic racial profiling risks. In particular, the proposed *Screening Regulation* introduces border “screening” procedures involving the rapid collection of biometric data, which is no longer limited to fingerprints but also includes facial images.

Asylum and return procedures are being accelerated as part of a dynamic that legitimises a *de facto* detention system in border areas, further reinforced by the recent strengthening of Europol’s role in the name of combating “irregular” migration.^[5] The limited regulatory framework governing the sharing of personal data between Member States, third countries, and European agencies (Frontex, Europol, eu-LISA) is marked by a **lack of effective transparency guarantees and independent oversight**, thereby increasing the risk of fundamental rights violations.^[6]

Beyond technical surveillance and screening mechanisms, the broader protection ecosystem is increasingly undermined by **criminalisation measures targeting human rights defenders and humanitarian actors**. Legal and political measures criminalising solidarity are increasing both within EU Member States and in Tunisia, creating a repressive climate that durably weakens protection systems.^[7] Under the guise of combating smuggling networks, the *Facilitators Package* exposes humanitarian actors and organisations to prosecution for “facilitating” irregular entry, transit and stay.

Across both shores of the Mediterranean, human rights defenders are prosecuted based on similar charges, such as “forming a criminal conspiracy”, “money laundering”, or “facilitating irregular migration”. The eight-year prison sentence handed down to anti-racist activist Saadia Mosbah in March 2026, in relation to the activities of her association *M’nemty*, as well as the prosecution of journalist and lawyer Sonia Dahmani in Tunisia, echo the case of former Calabrian mayor and current MEP Mimmo Lucano, who was prosecuted in 2021 for welcoming migrants to his town of Riace and only acquitted in 2024.^[8] These cases illustrate a structural trend towards **the erosion of civic space on both sides of the Mediterranean**.

2 The informalisation of migration agreements: The dilution of responsibilities and migrants' rights violations in Tunisia

The EU and its Member States increasingly rely on **soft law instruments** (memoranda of understanding, administrative arrangements) with third countries as part of the externalisation of migration management. These instruments are not subject to parliamentary debate, whether at the national or European level – a cornerstone of democratic governance – and thus largely escape judicial and political scrutiny. By their very nature, lacking binding force and sanction mechanisms, such instruments contribute to the **dilution of the responsibilities of EU Member States**, enabling the transfer of migration management to third countries – including countries of transit or origin – as well as to private actors. The **fragmentation of chains of accountability** among a plurality of actors (Member States, EU agencies, third countries, and private operators) complicates the identification of responsibility and hinders access to justice in cases of fundamental rights violations.

On 16 July 2023, the EU concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with Tunisia which, under the guise of combating so-called “irregular” migration and preventing loss of life at sea, conditions the provision of EU financial and technical support on the strengthening of Tunisia’s measures to control departures towards Europe. It thus institutionalises a **logic of mobility deterrence and conditionality** with third countries, in the absence of any impact assessment evaluating its effects on fundamental rights.

Regulation (EU) 2026/464 of 24 February 2026 also establishes a *common EU list of “safe countries of origin”*, including Tunisia, and consolidates the **“safe third country” concept**, allowing certain asylum applications to be declared inadmissible where applicants can be transferred to a third country considered to provide sufficient protection. This concept can be applied where an agreement is concluded between the EU, or a Member State, and a third country, thereby removing the previous requirement for the existence of a link between an asylum seeker and a given third country (*Regulation 2026/463*).

The European Parliament has also adopted a new *Return Regulation* introducing **“return hubs”** (detention centres for migrants located in non-EU countries), based on externalised and flexible governance, thereby reinforcing the logic of informalisation which characterises migration cooperation. At the same time, the regulation introduces a **“European return order”**, allowing for the deportation of individuals without a re-examination of their international protection applications by a Member State, where a removal decision has already been issued by another Member State.

However, several civil society organisations and international bodies challenge the “safety” of certain third countries, particularly Tunisia, where serious human rights violations against migrants, mainly of sub-Saharan origin, have been documented. These include physical violence, collective expulsions towards the Algerian and Libyan borders, forced displacement to desert areas, as well as arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment by security forces.^[9] In 2024, the European Ombudsman opened an own-initiative inquiry into how the EU ensures respect for human rights in the context of this cooperation, highlighting the European Commission’s lack of transparency.

Human rights violations in Tunisia have also been accompanied by a **weakening of institutional safeguards**. In 2022, for example, the National Data Protection Authority (INPDP) was effectively suspended. Nonetheless, the EU continues to cooperate with Tunisia regarding data transfers.

3 The normalisation and amplification of security-oriented and racist rhetoric in the media

Migration is increasingly subject to hostile media coverage and widely portrayed as a threat to public order and security. In both Europe and Tunisia, the securitisation of migration issues is reflected in political and media discourse alike, thereby shaping public opinion.

Media portrayals of migration across Europe, particularly during the 2015–2016 period, have conveyed a **stereotypical and negative image of non-European migrants**.^[10] This coverage has facilitated the proliferation and normalisation of racist, xenophobic and Islamophobic discourses, as well as the political instrumentalisation of violent or terrorist acts^[11] for electoral purposes.^[12] For some media outlets, migration coverage is also financially profitable. In France, for example, the television channel *CNews*, which regularly relays anti-immigration and Islamophobic rhetoric, became the country's leading news channel in 2025.

In Tunisia, the existence since 2018 of an organic law on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination has not prevented the emergence of racist hate speech. Following the presidential address delivered on 21 February 2023, in which sub-Saharan migrants were being accused of being behind a “criminal plan to alter the demographic composition of Tunisia”, racist discourses have proliferated across social media and mainstream media outlets. On Facebook, notably, anti-migrant campaigns have emerged, portraying newcomers as “settlers” and openly calling for acts of hatred, violence, expulsion, and even physical elimination.^[13] On the *Attessia* channel, a journalist sparked controversy in January 2026 after making racist remarks calling for restrictions on the reproductive rights of sub-Saharan migrant women.^[14]

Such discourses are largely disconnected from migration realities and serves to justify the hardening of migration policies on both sides of the Mediterranean, as well as the framing of migration within a permanent state of exception

4 The Spanish case: An alternative model based on regularisation and inclusion?

In Spain, the launch in January 2026 of a **regularisation process**, designed to benefit around 500,000 people, constitutes a notable alternative to the criminalisation of irregularised migrants already present in the EU. By simplifying procedures for obtaining residence and work permits, this reform, known as “*arraigo*”, promotes their **administrative and professional inclusion**, thereby facilitating **effective access to socio-economic rights**. It reflects a political commitment to inclusion rather than stigmatisation.

This progress, however, should be nuanced to avoid a utilitarian reading of migration, which would reduce individuals to a mere source of labour. Indeed, the reform is partly justified by the expected positive effects of reducing informal employment on public finances, particularly through increased social security contributions. Furthermore, it should be noted that, alongside this inclusion-oriented policy, the Spanish government maintains a strict approach to the externalisation and securitisation of its external borders, particularly in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as in the Canary Islands.



Reorienting EU Migration policies towards the de-securitisation and the de-criminalisation of migration

1) Ending the Securitarian Approach to Migration

Moving away from the penalisation of migration and the security-driven approach that contributes to the criminalisation of migrants.

EU Member States must:

- **Strictly define and circumscribe the concept of a “threat to public order”** by establishing clear, objective criteria subject to judicial review, to prevent its use as an automatic basis for return procedures under recent EU migration reforms (*EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, Return Regulation*).

EU Member States and the Tunisian Government must:

- **Prioritise proportionate administrative responses**, such as regularisation procedures, and legal and social support mechanisms, as alternatives to the criminal justice approaches;
- **Ensure effective and tailored access to legal assistance for migrants**, particularly in detention, return, or asylum procedures;
- **Promote the development of complementary pathways to access EU Member States**, including through employment, education, family reunification, and humanitarian visas.

3) Preventing and Addressing the Discriminatory Effects of Digital Border Surveillance

Establishing a legal framework adapted to emerging developments in digital border surveillance to prevent the discriminatory use of such systems.

EU Member States must:

- **Clarify rules on data retention periods and the purposes of data processing**, reduce retention periods and introduce automatic erasure, particularly for biometric data, whose use entails a heightened risk of racial profiling;
- **Prohibit decisions that concern the legal status of people on the move** (particularly asylum seekers) **based solely on automated processing and artificial intelligence**, and ensure the right to an explanation to guarantee individualised decision-making;

2) Supporting Networks Providing Solidarity with Migrants

Moving away from a securitarian approach by developing a structured public policy on solidarity that protects solidarity actors.

EU Member States and institutions must:

- **Revise the *Facilitators Package*** to introduce a harmonised and legally binding definition of “humanitarian assistance” across all Member States, and require the inclusion of an explicit exemption clause in national transposition laws to protect humanitarian acts;^[15]
- **Establish legal mechanisms to ensure the effective (rather than discretionary) participation of local authorities and civil society organisations**, particularly by involving them in the implementation and evaluation of migration policies;
- **Create dedicated funding and protection mechanisms** for organisations and individuals working in solidarity with migrants, in order to recognise and support their contribution to society;
- **Suspend migration agreements with third countries** where civil society organisations and solidarity actors are subject to persecution and/or prosecution for their support to migrants.

The Tunisian government must:

- **End abusive prosecutions, intimidation, and violence** against solidarity actors, and release civil society representatives and activists targeted for their work in support of migrants.

- **Prohibit the systematic analysis and extraction of data and private communications** from the personal digital devices (particularly mobile phones) of international protection applicants during asylum procedures.^[16]

EU institutions and bodies must:

- **Require European agencies** (Frontex, eu-LISA, Europol) **to ensure algorithmic transparency** and conduct regular bias assessments, while also introducing training programmes to promote their responsible and professional use.



Ensuring accountability in the context of the increasing informalisation of migration cooperation

1) Establishing a legal framework for the use of soft law in migration matters

Subjecting informal instruments (MOUs, administrative arrangements) to explicit obligations to comply with fundamental rights.

EU Member States and institutions must:

- **Provide a written legal justification demonstrating the compatibility of any migration-related instrument** – whether under negotiation or already in force – **with relevant international standards** (e.g. the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, the 1951 Geneva Convention, the European Convention on Human Rights);
- **Recognise the justiciability of these informal instruments** in light of their legal effects on the fundamental rights of migrants, thereby enabling their review by national and European courts.

3) Improving transparency and oversight of EU funding

Ensuring full traceability, effective oversight, and strict regulation of EU funding related to migration cooperation.

EU Member States and institutions must:

- **Publish detailed information on budget allocations, final beneficiaries and funded programmes** (at the operational level), within EU-third country planning frameworks, in line with the recommendations of the European Court of Auditors;^[17]
- **Negotiate the inclusion of mandatory suspension clauses in EU–Tunisia agreements**, explicitly providing for the automatic suspension of EU funding and data transfers in cases of documented violations of fundamental rights (in line with the recommendations of the European Ombudsman);^[18]
- **Immediately cease funding to the Tunisian National Guard**, in light of its involvement in serious fundamental rights violations;
- **Prioritise the reallocation of funding** towards reception, protection, and inclusion policies, grounded in solidarity and respect for human rights.

2) Establishing a democratic and independent oversight of migration agreements

Requiring systematic parliamentary scrutiny and independent evaluation mechanisms for all migration cooperation instruments concluded between the EU, its Member States and partner third countries, including the EU–Tunisia MoU.

EU Member States and institutions must:

- **Subject all migration cooperation agreements or instruments to systematic scrutiny by the European Parliament;**
- **Make independent fundamental rights impact assessments mandatory**, to be conducted *ex ante* and regularly by independent bodies (e.g. fundamental rights agencies, national human rights institutions, independent experts);
- **Carry out separate and regular assessments in partner third countries** (notably Tunisia), covering the legal framework (asylum, procedural safeguards, non-discrimination); the institutional framework (independence of oversight bodies); material reception conditions and access to rights; and the level of data protection in light of the requirements of *Chapter V of the GDPR and Regulation (EU) 2018/1725;*
- **Ensure the meaningful participation of civil society organisations in EU decision-making processes** through consultation mechanisms, including the possibility to submit alternative reports and contribute to the evaluation processes outlined above.

The Tunisian Government must:

- **Ensure the operationalisation of the National Commission for Combating Racial Discrimination;**
- **Adopt a national asylum law in line with international standards**, and establish a clear and accessible procedure for examining asylum applications.

4) Making data transfers conditional on effective respect for fundamental rights

EU Member States must:

- **Submit periodic assessments of EU digital systems** (databases, interoperability, surveillance tools) to the Council of the EU, carried out by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS);
- **Strengthen the mandate of the EDPS** by introducing mechanisms ensuring the justiciability of externalisation agreements, particularly where they produce legal effects on data subjects;
- **Clarify budgetary allocations under the EU Trust Fund for Africa**, including by identifying a dedicated line for data protection, and clarifying its link to the potential extension of the EDPS's mandate;
- **Strictly regulate the use of derogations under Article 49 of the GDPR**, particularly those based on explicit consent and important reasons of public interest, limiting them to exceptional circumstances and ensuring clear information for data subjects;
- **Establish joint liability in cases of shared data processing**, particularly in systems involving Frontex and eu-LISA, ensuring compliance with EU legal requirements on artificial intelligence and non-discrimination.



The Tunisian government must:

- **Reinstate the National Data Protection Authority (INPDP)** and mandate it to carry out a comprehensive audit of the handling of migrants' personal data by Tunisian authorities.

Strengthening media accountability to address security-driven and racist rhetoric

1) Promoting a humane and non-securitarian media coverage of migration

Improving the quality of public debates on migration by encouraging balanced, fact-based media coverage that respects press freedom.

All media organisations must:

- **Sign the *Marseille Charter on Information and Migration*** and integrate its principles into editorial and codes of ethics;^[19]
- **Establish continuous training programmes** for media professionals on best practices in reporting on migration issues.

The Tunisian government must:


- **Lift the suspension of the Independent High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAICA)** and reinstate its members;
- **Unblock the review of the draft law on freedom of audiovisual communication** by the Bureau of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People, whilst maintaining Article 4 on non-discrimination, accountability, data protection, and the prohibition of hate speech;
- **Adopt the 2023 draft of the guidance document on media coverage of migration-related matters** as a reference framework, ensuring the meaningful participation of all stakeholders.

2) Ensuring the representation and meaningful participation of migrants in media and editorial processes

Promoting diversity and a plurality of voices within the media by enabling people with lived migration experiences to contribute to migration narratives.

All media organisations must:

- **Create opportunities for journalists and contributors with lived migration experiences** to enhance diversity within editorial teams;
- **Adopt comprehensive anti-discrimination strategies** within media organisations.



References

1. Didier, B. (2002). Policing insecurity: Immigration, terrorism and the internal security state (pp. 63–85). Routledge.
2. Spijkerboer, T. (2018). Border policies and the politics of migration control (pp. 45–67). Oxford University Press.
3. United Nations (2024, 14 October). [Tunisie : des experts de l'ONU dénoncent des abus et des manœuvres dangereuses lors de l'interception de migrants en mer](#).
4. CCFD-Terre Solidaire. (2025). [Pacte européen sur la migration et l'asile : principales évolutions de politique extérieure et aux frontières](#).
5. EPP Group at the European Parliament (2025, 25 September). [Accord sur le renforcement d'Europol pour lutter contre le trafic de migrants](#).
6. European Commission (2026). [Migration and asylum](#).
7. Le Monde (2025, 7 juillet). [Frontex unlawfully shared thousands of people's personal data with European police](#).
8. Mediapart (2024, 4 May). [Acquitté, Mimmo Lucano rêve de propager le modèle d'accueil de son village à travers l'Europe](#).
9. Human Rights Watch (2024, October). Tunisia: Migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees ; Amnesty International (2025, novembre). [Tunisia: Rampant violations against refugees and migrants expose EU's complicity](#); RR [X] (2025, 29 January). State Trafficking. [Expulsion and sale of migrants from Tunisia to Libya](#).
10. Georgiou, M., Zaborowski, R. (2017). [Media coverage of the "refugee crisis": A cross-European perspective](#) (Council of Europe Report DG1 No. 3).
11. Siapera, E. (2020). [The political economy of digital media, migration and race](#). In K. Smets et al. (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of media and migration (p. 106). SAGE Publications.
12. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2020, 1 January). [Seven key elements on building human rights-based narratives on migrants and migration](#) (pp. 4–5).
13. Geisser, V. (2023). Tunisie, « la chasse aux migrants subsahariens est ouverte » : Comment la pionnière de la démocratie dans le monde arabe est devenue le théâtre d'un racisme d'État. *Migrations Société*, 1(191), 7–12.
14. Business News (2026, 7 January). [Vague d'indignation après des propos racistes sur Attesia](#).
15. Amnesty International (2025, 26 February). [Considerations on the European Commission's proposal to reform the facilitators package](#); Rodier, C. (2026) Directive « Facilitation » : l'UE fournit des armes contre les solidaires, Gisti.
16. Tempest, M. (2017, 29 March). [Des failles dans l'aide européenne à la Tunisie après le printemps arabe](#). Euractiv.
17. European Ombudsman (2024, 23 October). [La médiatrice critique le fait que la Commission n'ait pas informé le public de la manière dont elle a évalué les risques en matière de droits de l'homme dans l'accord UE-Tunisie](#).
18. Palmiotto, F., Ozkul, D. (2023, 1st March). ["Like Handing My Whole Life Over" The German Federal Administrative Court's Landmark Ruling on Mobile Phone Data Extraction in Asylum Procedures](#). Verfassungsblog.
19. Charte de Marseille (2025). [Marseille Charter on Information and Migration](#).

Reforming EU-Tunisia Migration Cooperation:

How to Prevent Discrimination and Fundamental Rights Violations Committed in the Name of Security?